Hilda A. Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co. : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Hilda A. Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co. : Brief
of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
George C. Henrich; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., No. 7979 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1952
l'· ' 
J ''\\ ,' 
. 
\ \, ·_ .. · ',, 
', ' 
,• 
In the , Supreme Cotn1 
of the State' of· Utah. 
IDLDA A. BRIMM~ I -
Plaintiff and. Re~pondent. 
' -( 
vs.-
·~, .'C"'"-\CHE ' 7ALLEY BANKING\CO~ ~ Oase ~.o. 7979 
1 
'-'._-·a-<fO-rPo:ration, ADMINISTR.AToR- ·RESPONDENT'S. 
OF THE ESTATE 'OFi,Al_\fDREW 1 ·• hRIEF·v -
\ . AND;ERSE,N, ' AKA, ANDREW I ' 
, ANDERSON,· J!~c~s~d .. · 
-.. D~fen~nt and Appellant/ , . 
'·-'. \ •, ·, 
.Appea,l from :th~- District Court. of :ithe. First 
. Judicial-District of the State'' .oi Utah 
·:hr:~dfor the C~unty of Cache·'_ 
I 
/·,: 
.Geo~ge1 C. He1nrf~h .,-.. -
Att(}rney · for f>I~intiff 
' \ ' ~ ' ; ' ' ' 
· ahd. Respo~dent.- _ \ · , 
' ' - ? ' . ~,\•., 
\ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'fABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Prelhninary Statetnent ------------------------------------------------~--- 1 
ARGr:MENT: 
Point No. 1 ; The lower court plainly did not err in 
finding and holding that the 112 shares of stock 
in the Mendon Central Irrigation Co., a corpor-
ation, is appurtenant to the lands described in 
the complaint. ------------------------------------------------------------ 2-15 
Point No. 2: The court did not err and could not 
have erred in holding that the water covered 
by certificate of stock and the water used on the 
land is one and the satne identical water, or used 
otherwise than for the irrigation of said land 
described in the decree because there is not even 
a conflict in the evidence as to these matters; 
and, that the water was never by any owner 
thereof either severed or intended to be sever-
ed from the lands. ---------------------------------------------------- 15-22 
Point No. 3 : The court plainly did not err in finding 
and holding that the said water stock certificate 
never has been and is not now personal property 
separate and apart from said lands, or even 
so considered. -------------------------------------------------------- 22-25 
Point No. 4: The court was correct in finding and 
holding that Mendon Central Irrigation Co. is 
a mutual company and that the interest in the 
water was conveyed with the land as an ap-
purtenance. -------------------------------------------------------------- 25-26 
Point No.5: The court was correct, in fact could not 
have done otherwise than to hold plaintiff to 
be the owner of certificate No. 24 and providing 
for the issuance of another one for the 112 
shares of stock by the Mendon Central Irriga-
tion Company. -------------------------------------------------------- 27-28 
Point No. 6: ].,in ding No. 4 is properly included in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the findings and is. supported by equitable con-
siderations. ----------~'--~------------------------------------------------ 28-29 
Point No. 7: The court's holding quieting title in the 
plaintiff, etc., is supported in equity, and is 
entitled to be sustained by this court. 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Adamson vs. Brockbank, 185 Pac. 2, 264 ------------------------ 14 
Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 72 Pac. 2d, 630, at 635. ____ 10 
First N tl. Bank vs. Hastings, 42 Pac. 681 -------------------- 25 
George vs. Robinson, 63 Pac. 819 ------------ 2,8,9,13,15,23,25 
In re Johnson's Estate, 228 Pac. 7 48 ---------------------------- 9 
East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, 
128 Pac. 2, 277 -------------------·-----·-----·---·---· 13,16,18,20,25, 
Oppenlander vs. Left Hand Ditch Co. 31 Pac. 854 ______ 11 
Snyder vs. Murdock, 50 Pac. 9 ------------------------------------ 30 
Thompson vs. Mcinney, 63 Pac. 2d, 1056 ---------------------- 9 
Yellowstone Valley Co. vs. Associated 
Mortgages Invest. Co. 290 Pac. 255 ------------------------ 14 
53 An1. J ur., Waters, Sec. 243, 254 -------------------------------- 14 
70 A.L.R. 1002 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
STATUTES. 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 73-1-1 ____ :_______________________________________ 2 
U.C.A. 1943, Session Laws, 1943, page 154. 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 73-1-10 ---------------------------------------- 13,15 
U.C.A. 1943, Sec. 71-1-11 -------------------------------------------- 14 
U.C.A. 1943, Sec. 100-1-10 -------------------------------- 15,18,20 
U.C.A. 1943, Sec. 100-1-11 ---------------------------------- 19,20 
Com. Laws, Utah, 1917, Sec. 878 ---------------------------- 23 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 16-2-34 -------------------------------------------- 23 
U.C.A. 1943, Sec. 18-2-23 -------------------------------------------- 23 
U.C.A. 1943, Title 18, Chapter 2 --------------------------·- 24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme ··court 
of the State of· Utah 
HILDA A. BRIMM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
CACHE VALLEY BANKING CO. Case No. 7979 
a corporation, ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENT'S 
OF THE ESTATE OF ANDREW BRIEF 
ANDERSEN, AKA, ANDREW 
ANDERSON, Deceased. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that this is a 
quiet title action. The facts are not in dispute, or at 
least there is very little dispute as to what the facts 
are, but there is considerable dispute between these 
parties as to the interpretation and m'eaning to be ap-
lied to them, legally. And, except for a few ommissions, 
appellant's Statement of Facts, are fairly acurate. Re-
spondent will supply such omissions during the course 
of her argument rather than to make an additional or 
supplemental statement of facts, believing this will be in 
the interest of clarity as well as to shorten this brief. 
While appellant did object to the introduction of some 
of the evidence--the use to which the waters emant-
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2 
ing from the springs have always been put to-it is be. 
lieved that there is not and could not be any dispute 
as to these facts themselves. Respondent will answer 
appellant's argument, point by point in the order in 
which presented. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1: The lower court plainly did not err 
in finding and holding that the 112 shares of stock in 
the Mendon Central Irrigation Co., a corporation, is 
appurtenant to the lands described in the complaint. 
Appellant argues at pages 8 to 10 of its brief that 
because the early water users formed a corporation 
in 1917-1918, the Mendon Central Irrigation Co., and in 
exchange for the conveyance by them of their respective 
rights to the use of the waters emanating from certain 
springs they each received a certain number of shares 
of stock issued by the newly formed corporation which 
entitled each of them to a like amount of water (the 
same as they each formerly had), that therefore, ipso 
facto, the certificates of stock and the water represented 
thereby became personal property, the water was sever· 
ed from the land, that the water represented thereby 
could not be, remain or become appurtenant to any lands 
unless the certificate of stock itself was specifically 
transferred, and then cites and relies upon George vs. 
Robison, et al, 63 Pac. 819 (Utah) (1901) and also refers 
and quotes from Sec. 73-1-1 UCA, 1953 in support. 
Appellant then concludes that the Deed of Water Right8, 
Defs. Ex. 1, severed the water from the land, and then 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ask::-; "'what proof has plaintiff produced to show that 
she is the owner of this water right'" and then answer-
ing the question thus asked asserts, ''Absolutely none.'' 
This therefore involves a question of both facts and 
applicable law. First as to the fact, ''what proof has 
plaintiff produced to show that she is the owner of this 
water right'" 
Here is the proof! On ~::t:arch 18, 1895, Andrew 
Andersen and his wife, Sofia Anderson, conveyed the 
17.63 acre tract to James Quayle and Joseph E. Cowley, 
and .Andrew Andersen never thereafter acquired title 
to this tract for on May 28, 1896, Quayle and Cowley 
conveyed to said Sophia Andersen. Certainly under 
all law this conveyance carried with it the water right 
and if so, then it must follow that a re-conveyance gave 
the water right to Sophia Andersen. This same tract 
was also conveyed to her a little over a month previous, 
on April 7, 1896, by the Mayor of Mendon City with 
appurtenances. (Abst. 8-10). The Articles of Incorpor-
ation of Mendon Irrigation Co. are dated Feb. 9, 1918, 
bears the signature of Andrew Andersen (not that of 
Sophia Andersen, the wife, who at that time undoubt-
edly under all law was the owner of the water as a 
part of the real estate) as one of the incorporators. 
Article 6 provides : ''That the purpose for which this 
corporation is formed, and the pursuit and business 
agreed upon, is to engage exclusively in furnishing water 
to and for lands owned by the stockholders thereof, etc.'' 
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Defs. Ex. 2). Defs. Ex. 1, Deed of Water Rights, was 
signed ~larch 9, 1918, and was joined in by Sophia 
Andersen, wife of one of the ''incorporators,'' her 
husband Andrew Andersen. Querry, if any stock thus 
issued to an ''incorporator'' who was not then the own-
er of any lands to be irrigated from the waters emanat-
ing from the spring waters became anything more than 
the holder of a certificate of stock as a trustee for the 
land owner? But be this as it may, at this time and 
always since the lands were irrigated without interrup-
tion from the waters which emanated from the springs 
referred to in the exhibits and in appellant's brief, 
page 5. On July 23, 1918, Andrew Andersen conveyed 
the 2.50 acre tract to his wife, Sophia Andersen. ( Abs. 
19). 
Andrew Andersen died July 19, 1922, at Mendon. 
On January 25, 1924, Sophia L. Andersen, his widow, 
conveyed the said tracts to L. M. Andersen, her son, 
who was a bachelor. (Abst. 15) L. M. Andersen died 
November 18, 194 7, and on May 24, 1948, Decree of 
Final Distribution was entered in his estate by the 
terms of which, in addition to other property, an un-
divided 6 7/72 interest in the said two tracts of land 
was distributed to Catherine S. Gibbons. (Abst. 20-2fl). 
And on July 7 and July 26, 1948, by separate deeds 
Raymond Andersen, et. al., and Mrs. Farrell Thomas 
conveyed their interests in said tracts to CathPrinl' S. 
Gibbons (Abst. 26-27). By this time she had acquired 
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an ~ 19ths interest in the property. On January 25, 1949, 
Catherine S. Gibbons, conveyed her undivided 8/9ths 
interest in said tracts to Hilda A. Brimm, formerly 
Hilda ..:\. Leonard, a niece b~, relation and a sister by 
adoption to Catherine S. Gibbons and L. M .. Andersen, 
deceased. On June 22, 1949, this plaintiff, Hilda A. 
Brim1n, acquired the rmnaining outstanding 1/9th in-
terest in said tracts of land for a consideration of 
$2,000.00 from her uncle by relation and brother by adop-
tion, John C. Andersen, who is one of the petitioners 
herein for letters of administration on the estate of 
Andrew ~lndersen, deceased, his deceased father. (Abst. 
29) Hilda A. Leonard had previously conveyed her in-
terest as an heir of L. ~I. Andersen to Catherine S. 
Gibbons. ( Abst. 20) By Decree of District Court of 
Cache County dated Sept. 11, 1950, affirmed by this 
court in 230 Pac. 2nd 983, Hilda A. Brimm, plaintiff 
herein, was adjudged to be the owner of said two tracts 
of land (and other land) burdened to support Catherine 
S. Gibbons, a daughter of Andrew Andersen, deceased, 
The heirs of L. M. Andersen and Andrew Andersen 
are the same. (Tr. 41) Both tracts of land have al-
ways been watered from water out of Mendon Central Ir-
rigation Company canals and ditches. (Tr. 28-23) Land is 
worth little without water. (Tr. 34-36). Water covered by 
certificate of stock and that used to irrigate is the sanw 
water. (Tr. 36) All assessments which called for labor 
have been paid or worked out (Tr. 45-47-49) Never 
any interference with the right to use water until last 
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summer. (1951) (Tr. 49-50) It will be observed also 
that many of the conveyances referred to include ap-
purtenant water rights belonging to the land conveyed 
(abst. 22,26,27,28) and that the persons making these 
conveyances are also heirs of Andrew Andersen, De-
ceased. It would seem from this, reasonably, that every-
body considered the water as appurtenant to the lands 
upon which the water has always been used. There 
is certainly no evidence anywhere in the record of a 
contrary intention. 
Having thus answered appellant's question as to 
"what proof plaintiff produced to show that she is the 
owner of the water right'', it may now be appropriate 
to ask what proof has appellant, except the stub of the 
stock ledger which simply shows delivery of the certif-
icate of stock to Andrew Andersen if this constitutes 
any probative value at all at this late date, on April 
30, 1918 to the right to the use of the water in question, 
and also, further, upon what equitable principles 
can appellant claim ownership? Appellant does 
not even have p o s s e s s i o n of the certificate 
itself. Nor offer any explanation as to where it is, 
except that they do not know. For ought they know 
Andrew Andersen may have endorsed and delivered it 
in his lifetime to his wife, and such an assumption is 
much more in keeping with reason than it would be to 
conclude that he intended his wife to have the owner-
ship of the lands but without the water and without 
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which they are of little use and value. An assumption 
of endorse1nent and delivery, it seen1s to the writer, is 
much more in keeping with reasonableness on the part 
of Andrew Andersen, deceased, than it would be to pre-
~tune, as appellant does on page 11 of brief, that no 
water right was mentioned in the· conveyance from 
Sophia Andersen to her son, L. M. Andersen, because 
they no doubt knew the water right could not be 
transferred by deed, and that the ownership of water 
was then vested in the estate of Andrew Andersen, de-
ceased. Certainly if this was the case a probate would 
not have been delayed for a period of thirty years. 
It is submitted everybody always considered the water 
part of the land, some of them adverting to putting 
such references in the conveyances and some simply 
overlooking the fact, which made no difference legally 
so far as the water being appurtenant is concerned. 
So much then for what might be inferred from the fact 
that plaintiff does not have possession of the certificate, 
and for the fact that appellant who claims to be the 
owner thereof knows nothing about what deceased did 
with it-if this sort of inference legally has anything 
to do with right to use of water-under the facts and 
circumstances in the case at bar. If it does, then the 
fact remain that appellant who claims to be the owner 
of the water does not have the certificate nor explain 
where it is, nor do they show that they ever used the 
water or even ever paid an assessment. All appellant 
says is that we want the water. 
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And at pages 10-12 of brief appellant says the deed 
given (Defs. Ex. 1) completely severed the water froin 
the land, that the water could then be used in whole or 
in part upon other lands, and that the certificate and 
water represented thereby became and forever remained 
personal property, unless the certificate is delivered to 
the owner of the land. Of course, the water could be 
used upon any lands served by the canal company's 
ditches, etc. There is no quarrel with this statement. 
But the fact remains that this water never was used 
upon any lands other than the two tracts of land. 
This is not even disputed. And at page 12 of brief 
appellant quotes rather copiously from George vs. Rob-
inson, 63 Pac. 819. (Utah) (1901). The question in 
this case was simply whether or not there was a breach 
of warranty because there was no water with the land. 
A cursory reading of the record in the case at bar 
discloses a vast difference with respect to the use of 
water, payment of assessments, etc., with the facts in 
the Robinson case, supra. Then too in the Robinson 
case at page 819, right hand column, it says, ''Were, 
then, the water rights in fact appurtenant to the land~ 
If they were, the absence of any mention of them 
in the deed is immaterial; but, if not, the warranty does 
not include them. To determine the question thus 
presented reference must be had to the evidence dehors 
the instrument of record". 
The facts above produced shows without contradic-
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tion that the water has alway~ been appt1rtenant. Under 
our decisions water i~ '"appurtenant" if water is used 
in direct connection with the real estate conveyed. 
Thmnpson vs. ~Ir l(inney 63 Pac. 2d. 1056. Enough 
has then been here said to show that the facts in the 
case at bar and the Robinson case are not even anala-
gous. But even so, the George vs. Robinson case, supra, 
has been overruled by this court in, In re Johnson's 
Estate, 22S Pac. 7-±8, (Utah) (1924), where, at page 
751, bottom of right hand coluinn referring to the Robin-
son case this court had the following to say: 
"It is true that the decision is based largely 
upon the argument that the shares of stock re-
presenting the water rights in quesion were per-
sonal property and therefore not capable of being 
appurtenant to real estate. This is the general 
rule with respect to shares of stock in ordinary 
corporations, organized for pecuniary gain. But 
we think the rule is not absolute, and should not 
apply to shares of stock in an irrigation company 
which is not organized for profit but for the 
convenience of owners of water rights in the 
regulation and distribution of the water to which 
they are entitled. This distinction was not con-
sidered in the opinion of the court and there 
were other controlling factors in the case, for 
which reason the general rule there expressed 
should be modified, when applied to a case like 
the one at bar." 
It is plain, therefore, whether or not water repre-
sented by certificates of stock is appurtenant to lands 
is a rebuttable presumption, and not a conclusive one 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
as appellant contends, and that -the proof in the case 
at bar conclusively rebuts any contrary presumption 
which might be indulged springing from a mere delivery 
of a stock certificate to Andrew Andersen, now de-
ceased, more than thirty-three years prior to the date 
of trial. But appellant will probably argue that in re 
Johnson's Estate, supra, is a will case and so not in 
point. But a reading of the case will clearly show that 
this can make no difference so far as the holding here 
relied upon is concerned. Also, other cases decided 
by our court have dealt and shows clearly the trend 
and holding of our court on the question here present-
ed. In Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 72 Pac. 2d. 630, 
(Utah) (1937) at page 635, note 5, after citing cases 
where the fact of appurtenancy was also questioned, the 
court said: 
''The defendant argues that the water in the 
canal is personal property and so could not be-
come appurtenant to the lands on which it was 
used and cites, etc. . We do not deem it nec-
essary to determine whether the corpus of the 
water in the city's canal is personalty or realty. 
We are not here dealing with water as personal 
property but with the right to the use of water 
created and bestowed by the exchange agree-
ment for the benefit of certain lands. This 
involves a right to the flow of water in and 
from the city's canal to be used upon said 
lands. Such a right is treated as an incorporeal 
hereditament as distinguished from the corpus 
of the water, and is real property.'' 
Appellant next quotes extensively frmn Oppenlander 
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v~. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 31 Pac. 85-! (Colo.) and states 
that the decision of this court in George vs. Robinson, 
supra, is supported by that case. George vs. Robinson 
was decided by our court in 1901 and the Oppenlander 
case wa~ decided in 1892, nine years· earlier, and the 
Robinson case does not even mention it. The Oppen-
lander case is unimportant for at least two reasons: 
First, the facts are entirely different. There the stock 
was sold, but even so the question of the water being 
appurtenant, if it could have been shown, was left open; 
Therefore, upon examination, the case contains no 
points of analogy, but many points of difference from 
the facts in the case at bar; and second, our court has 
decided in the question contrary in In re Johnson's 
Estate, supra. 
Now as to appellant's other claim, the water was 
severed from the land~ Certainly to say it was severed, 
does not make it severed. There is no evidence in the 
record of severance so far as usage of the water is 
concerned because it is undisputed that for more than 
fifty years (Abst. 2) the water has without interruption 
been used upon the lands in question. As stated 
the Articles of Incorporation were signed February 
6, 1918. The purpose and business agreed upon 
was as stated in Article 6, ''is to engage exclusively in 
furnishing water to and for lands owned by the stock-
holders thereof''. Andrew Andersen was not even then 
a landowner. Article 5 provides for the issuance of a 
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lilnit of 1350 shares of stock of different classes and 
kinds which were to be issued in exchange of certain 
spring water rights. Article 7 -A again provides that 
the rights and privileges are based upon the respective 
prior rights of the stockholders in and to the use of 
the waters arising from the mentioned springs. Article 
7 -B provides that the assessments shall be limited to re-
pairs and maintenance of ditches necessary for the dis-
tribution of waters to the holders of stock. Article 8 
provides that dividends shall only consist of the dis-
tribution of such water to each of the stockholders as 
he is entitled to, and not otherwise. By Article 19 each 
signer of the Articles represented that he is the owner 
of a vested primary right to the use of the waters offer-
ed in exchange for stock to be issued to him. It is sub-
mitted that Andrew Andersen was not at this time the 
owner of any primary right because he did not have title 
to the land to which the water was then undeniably 
appurtenant and a part of. It was realty and the water 
has never been severed therefrom by any act or deed 
of Sophia Andersen. The Articles clearly show that 
the Mendon Central Irrigation Co. is nothing more nor 
less than a mutual irrigation company, not organized 
for profit, but for the convenience of its members in the 
management of the irrigation system and in the distri-
bution to them of water for use upon their lands in pro-
portion to their respective interests, and that ownership 
of shares of stock in the corporation is but incidental 
to ownership of the water right. 
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l:( Appellant at page 14 of brief, state~, ''If there 
~ could be an~· doubt whether a water right represented 
~ b~· shares of stock in a co1·po1·ation, is apptlrtenant to 
the land upon which it i~ used, such doubt was rmnoved 
by the Legislature when it mnended Section 100-1-10, 
U. C. A .,1943, Session Laws 1943, page 154, which 1s 
now 73-1-10, U. C. A. 1953, and then quotes: 
''\Vater rights shall be transferred by deed 
in substantially the same manner as real estate, 
except when they are represented by shares of 
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall 
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land.'' 
It is believed that counsel for appellant construes 
the above words which I have underlined to be a con-
clusive presumption and that in this he is in error. 
As previously pointed out, respondent takes the position 
that the language underlined constitutes a rebuttable 
presumption at most and that this has been abundantly 
met by the evidence produced. Also, it is in keeping 
with the decisions in George vs. Robinson, supra, that 
evidence of appurtenancy may be proven by proof 
dehors the instrument, and the decision in In re John-
son's Estate, supra. And following said Section 73-1-10 
is also cited the case of East River Bottom Water Co. 
vs. Boyce, 128, Pac. 2d 277, decided by this court July 
23, 1942, wherein it is stated: 
"Where Articles of agreement of water com-
pany set forth object of company to be the con-
trolling, managing, and distribution of certain 
water of a certain river, it was held that such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
limited and restrictive words did not constitute 
a conveyance separating a water right appurten-
ant to land from the land, and did not vest the 
title or right of use in the corporation within 
the provisions of this section''. 
It is respondent's position that the purposes as con-
tained in the Articles of Incorporation of Mendon 
Central Irrigation Co. comes within the holding of this 
case and that because thereof the "Deed of Water 
Rights'' did not, therefore, ipso facto, constitute a sev-
erence. 56 A. J. Waters, Sees. 243, 254. See also Yel-
lowstone Valley Co. vs. Associated Mortgages Inves-
tors, 290 Pac. 255, (Mont.), 70 A. L. R. 1002. Adamson 
vs. Brockbank (Utah) 185 Pac. 2d 264. In this last 
case our court also refers to Sec. 78-1-11, U. C. A. 1943, 
which provides that a deed in statutory form includes 
appurtenances therewith, and then: 
''If a deed by statute has the effect of pas-
sing all appurtenances to the property, then it 
is not varying the terms of a written instrument 
to establish what was appurtenant to the prop-
erty. To hold to the contrary would render the 
quoted statute nugatory.'' 
The court then held in this, the Adamson vs. Brock-
bank case, that by reason of the implied easement that 
plaintiff should prevail, that the ditch is an appurten-
ance reasonably necessary to the use of the land for the 
purposes for which it was bought, in line with the vis-
ible objects (ditch) and the intended use of the land 
for farming purposes. By analogy, in the case at bar 
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certainly upon each transfer of the land by . deed, the 
ditches \vere. undoubtedly, apparent ,and hence the need 
for irrigation water also. Incidentally, following said 
Section 78-1-11, George vs. Robinson, supra, is quoted 
for the proposition that deed of general warranty of 
quiet and peaceable possession does not warrant water 
rights unless they are appurtenant to land conveyed. 
At page 11 of brief appellant says that the deed 
from Sophia Andersen does not even mention a water 
right, that the reason it was not mentioned was because 
. grantor and grantee "no doubt knew that the water 
right could not be transferred by deed'', then cites 
Sec. 3-±78. Laws of Utah, 1917, which was then in force, 
and at page 14 of brief points out that these same laws 
were continued in force by Sec. 100-1-10, U. C. A. 1943, 
and Sec. 73-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, except for the part under-
lined following which was added: 
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed 
in substantially the same manner as real estate, 
except when they are represented by shares of 
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall 
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land.'' 
This has been fully answered by what has been 
said about whether or not this constitutes a rebuttable 
or conclusive presumption and so will not be answered 
further, 
Point No. 2: The court did not err and could not 
have erred in holding that the water covered by certif-
icate of stock and the water used on the land is one 
and the same identical water, or used otherwise than 
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for the irrigation of said land described in the decree 
because there is not even a conflict in the evidence as 
to these matters; and, that the water was never by any 
owner thereof either severed or intended to be severed 
from the lands. 
This point is intended to cover and answer appel-
lant's point No. 2. All that part of the above, except 
that underlined, has been previously answered in this 
brief under point No. 1, so will not be further answered 
here. However, while appellant mentioned all of the 
above, in support thereof he only covers that part un-
derlined, quotes the Deed to Water Rights, (Def's. Ex. 
1) and then cites and quotes from East River Bottom 
Water Company vs. Boyce, et. al., 128 Pac. 2d 277, 
(Utah), (1942) and then attempts to bring the facts 
in the case at bar within that decision. 
An analogy will show more points of difference 
than of similarity. Some of the main provisions of the 
Articles of Incorporation of Mendon Central Irriga-
tion Co. were pointed out under Point No. 1 so will 
not be repeated here. The Articles certainly show that 
the purpose ''is to engage exclusively in furnishing 
water to and for lands owned by the stockholders 
thereof (Art. 6), dividends shall consist of the distribu-
tion to the stockholders of such water as they shall 
be entitled to (Art. 8), costs of repairs of maintenance 
of ditches, etc., is to be assessed pro-rata against the 
different classes of stock (Art. 7-B), each party coven-
ants with all other parties to the agreement that he 
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It' the owner of a vested primary right to the use 
for irrigation purposes of a part of the waters arising 
and flowing from certain springs, which he agrees to 
conYey as and for payment in full for the capital stock 
subscribed for by him (Art. 19), and the rights and privi-
leges of the respective kinds and classes of stock and 
:: the holders thereof in this corporation, are based upon 
the respect,ire prior vested rights of the stockholders, 
in and to the use of the waters arising and flowing 
from certain spring, and in accordance with such prior 
vested rights, each class of stock issued by the corpor-
ation entitles the holder to the following rights and 
privileges and none other, to-wit: the holder thereof 
shall have the right to the use of a stream of water 
arising from named springs in accordance with a sched-
ule prepared from time to time by the directors. (Art. 
7A) 
But appellant says that because a deed was execut-
ed there was a severance of the appurtenant water 
rights to the corporation. First it must be again point-
ed out that Andrew Andersen's representation to the 
corporation when he signed the articles that he was the 
owner of a primary vested water right was not a fact 
because title to the lands were then vested in his wife 
and that therefore any stock issued to him must be 
deemed to belong to his wife and that he held the same 
as trustee for her in whom was vested the legal title 
to the lands. Counsel seems to place a good deal of 
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stress throughout the brief by repeating that there wa~ 
a severance by reason of the execution of the instru-
ment entitled "Deed of Water Rights." In this re-
gard respondent desires to say it is immaterial whether 
a transfer to the corporation is made by the Deed of 
Water Rights or as was done in East River Bottom 
Water Co. vs. Boyce, supra, by "The signing of the 
articles of agreement and the payment of the amount re-
quired ''shall constitute a transfer of all rights and 
privileges of the parties to the control, management 
and distribution of the water of the corporation, and 
will entitle the said parties to receive stock certificates 
for the amount of the interest in the corporation.'' The 
point is that whatever method was used served the pur-
pose of making the required transfer to a mutual com-
pany. And the fact that Mrs. Andersen joined in the 
execution of the Deed of Water Rights cannot help 
appellant. He was not a grantee. But even so, assum-
ing him to be the rightful owner of the stock, the Articles 
of Incorporation and the Deed of Water Rights must 
be read in the light of the provisions of said Sections 
100-1-10 and 100-1-11 (now Sees. 73-1-10 and 73-1-11, 
U. C. A. 1953) and also in the light of the decision 
of our court in East Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, supra. 
And in this connection it must also be noted that counsel 
for appellant in arriving at the conclusion he does 
under Point No. 2 ignores entirely the provisions of 
said Section 100-1-11 and the decisions of our court 
following respecting appurtenant waters which is here-
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by specifically referred to. So in construing the Deed 
of "\Yater Rights and the Articles of Incorporation to-
gether in accordance with their agreement what did 
they accomplish Y The first parties to the deed (except 
the wives) are the incorporators (and Andrew Ander-
sen could not in fact be one because he did not own 
the lands and hence no primary vested water right as 
called for by the articles) and so as such conveyed 
to the corporation ''all of the right, title and interest 
of the incorporators in and to certain spring and waters 
arising in and flowing from same as described in the 
the articles", etc., as and for full payment 
for the capital stock subscribed by them. And 
then it may be asked, for what purpose was the convey-
ance made? "To engage exclusively in furnishing water 
to and for lands owned by the stockholders thereof'' 
(Art. 6) "based upon the respective prior vested rights 
of the stockholders'' the stockholders ''shall have the 
right to the use" etc .. "of a stream of water" from 
certain named springs according to schedule prepared 
by the Board of Directors. (Art. 7 -A) The only divi-
dends they were to receive was the distribution of the 
water they were entitled to under Art. 7-A. Is this 
then anything but the formation of a mutual company 
for any purpose other than the ''control, management 
and distribution'' of the waters of the springs Y It 
severed nothing because the owners of the land still 
retains the use of the same water with their lands. 
"It did not vest the title or right of use in the corpor-
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ation within the provisions of Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, Sees. 100-1-10 and 100-1-11 ". The only thing 
the corporation could do was to "manage, control and 
distribute- the water" according to a schedule prepared 
by the Board of Directors. The water right was there-
fore never severed from the land and is still appurten-
ant. And in the language used in East River Bottom 
\Vater Co. vs. Boyce, supra, at page 278, right hand 
column, would not ''An examination of the articles of 
agreement to determine what a stock certificate repre-
sented, either for investment of loan purposes, dis-
close what the certificate actually represented." It, 
therefore, is submitted that even without consideration 
of the provisions of said Section 100-1-11, Water as 
Appurtenant, which counsel completely overlooks, the 
conveyance did not divest anything from the land. 
Another matter, East River Bottom Water Co. vs. 
Boyce, supra, involved the question of a duplicate issue 
of seven shares stock which had been pledged to the 
State Bank of Provo as security for a loan and the 
plaintiff water company brought action to declare the 
duplicate issue void and the court did so upon the theory 
that the plaintiff was simply a mutual company, and not 
a corporation existing for profit. 
In the case at bar the facts are vastly different. 
Here no third party or "outsider" has acquired any 
interest. Andrew must have intended or arranged for 
Quayle and Cowley to have conveyed the 17.63 acres 
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\ to his wife, otherwise he would not have later conveyed 
~ the 2.50 acre to her. It cannot be presumed he wanted 
I• her to have the land and not the water with it, without 
~ which it would be of little value. There is no evidence 
~!' over all the years on the part of any one to sever the 
water from the land by sale, mortgage of the stock, 
or otherwise. rrhe same water continued to be used 
on the smne land as originally except that it was con-
trolled and distributed by the irrigation company. That 
it was understood by all concerned that it was consid-
ered as part of the real estate is certainly most strongly 
indicated because the widow conveyed to her son L. M. 
Andersen, who continued to use these same waters on 
the same lands without question or interference for a 
period of over 23 years until his death. Then his estate 
was probated and assignments and conveyances were 
made by his heirs (who are the same as those of his 
father, Andrew Andersen, deceased) to Catherine Gib-
bons, who in turn conveyed to this plaintiff as herein-
before stated. And that during all this period of time 
there was no attempt on the part of any heir to secure 
a probate of his estate, until some thirty years later 
when one of the heirs initiated probate proceedings, the 
only property listed being the 112 shares of water stock 
involved in this case. It would seem that such a re-
cord establishes appurtenancy of the water so clearly 
that it would not even be questioned. And appurtenancy 
is a question of fact. It is therefore submitted that 
appellant's Point No. 2 is not well taken in any view 
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whatsoever, either based upon the facts of usage of 
water over the years, or upon the Deed of Water 
Rights, the Articles of Incorporation, the Statutes refer-
red . to, or the decision in the East River Bottom Co. 
vs. Boyce, supra, upon which appellant relies. 
Point No. 3: The court plainly did not err in find-
ing and holding that the said water stock certificate 
never has been and is not now personal property sep-
arate and apart from said lands, or even so considered. 
It is believed that this point has already been an-
swered by what has been previously said under Points 
1 and 2, and so the following will only answer the state-
ments, etc., made by appellant under Point No. 3, which 
it is believed requires answering. First appellant makes 
the statement that it is conceded by plaintiff that the 
water right is represented by a certificate of stock in 
a corporaion. This statement may be admitted, but. 
the admission carries with it only such rights and privi-
leges as contended for in Point No. 2 above. Nor does 
respondent admit that Andrew Anderson at the time of 
his death, nor his estate, is the owner of the certificate. 
Appellant has the burden in this respect. The facts 
produced, respondent contends, dissipates any proba-
tive value of ownership which might arise from the sig-
nature appearing on the stub of the stock ledger. In 
fact, respondent does not admit Andrew Andersen ever 
was the real owner of the certificate even though issued 
in his name because at the time of signing the Articles 
of Incorporation he was not then the owner of a vested 
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primary water right as he then represented. 
Counsel next contends that the finding of the lower 
court that the stock never has been and is not personal 
property separate and apart from said lands is made 
in the very teeth of Sec. 878, Compiled Laws of Utah 
1917, (which is now 16-2-34, U. C. A. 1953) and quotes 
therefrom. A reference to this section shows that it 
is a part of Title 19, Chapter 1, General Incorporation. 
This section deals more particularly with shares of stock 
of pecuniary corporations. Following this section is 
cited the case of George vs. Robinson, supra, which 
has already been discussed, and in addition to what 
has already been said regarding this case it is submit-
ted that the facts and reasoning in the case hardly sup-
ports the syllabus in its entirety and that it therefore 
does not hold what the syllabus would indicate. But 
even so, then section quoted at the top of page 18 says 
''stock shall be deemed personal property'' and the de-
livery of certificate together with a written transfer of 
the same, signed by the owner to a bona fide purchase 
or pledge for value shall be deemed a sufficient trans-
fer of title. Appellant cannot possibly benefit any by 
this provision because it has been complied ·with in no 
respect at all. Appellant cannot even produce the cer-
tificate. 
Counsel next states that at time of judgment Sec. 
18-2-23, 1943 (which is now 16-2-34 1953 was in full force, 
quotes the section and then asks, can there by any doubt 
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about the stock belonging to Andrew Andersen's estate 
and then says that for some unaccountable reason the 
lower court refused to apply this section to the settled 
facts of the case. This section is also part of the gen-
eral incorporation law applicable to corporations organ-
ized for profit. See Chapter 2, Title 18, U. C. A., 1943. 
A glance at this section shows that it has no application 
to the facts in the case at bar. The section has two pur-
poses: 1) For purposes of voting, receiving dividends, 
levying and collecting assessments, etc., wherein the 
corporation is interested the stockholder of record shall 
be treated and considered the holder in fact. There 
were no dividends paid except the distribution of water 
which over the years went with the record owners of 
the land; the record is silent as to who did the voting 
at any time, and the assessments were paid always by 
those who were the record owners of the land. The 1\fen-
don Central Irrigation Co. was therefore always satis-
fied. At least there is no record of any complaint 
by it. 2) The transferee shall have no rights or claims 
as against the corporation until transfer thereof is 
made upon the books of the corporation or a new certif-
icate is issued to him. No claim has been made by any 
one against the corporation so far as the record dis-
closes nor has a new certificate yet been issued, although 
the findings and decree (Tr. 11-13) finds and directs 
the said Mendon Irrigation Co. to issue another certif-
icate to plaintiff in lieu of certificate No. 24, for the 
112 shares of stock, under appropriate safeguards, 
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after which this plaintiff will then be the record owner 
of the certificate as well as the real owner thereof. 
Coun8el next cites, quotes from, and then argues 
that George vs. Robinson, supra, is controlling in the 
case at bar. X othing can be added to what has al-
ready been said by respondent in regards to this case, 
and the fact that it has been overruled by In re John-
son ~s estate, supra, and so no further comment will 
be made. I do not notice where First National Bank 
ve. Hastings, -!2 Pac. 681, (Col) is cited in George vs. 
Robinson, supra, but even if so it cannot have any 
weight since our court has decided the question other-
wise. The issues were not at all alike. The question 
there was the rights of attaching creditors of the per-
son in whose name the stock stood and a purchaser of 
the stock before issuance of new certificate. It is 
therefore submitted that the stock in question could 
not be personal property for any of the reason given 
under appellant's Point No. 3, and that the lower court 
was correct in its holding. 
Point No. 4: The court was corerct in finding and 
holding that Mendon Central Irrigation Co. is a mutual 
company and that the interest in the water was convey-
ed with the land as an appurtenance. 
Under this assignment appellant refers to and 
quotes from East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce 
supra, and the Deed of Water Rights. Respondent 
considered both of the propositions mentioned under 
Point No. 1, where it seemed appropriate in view of 
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the matters there mentioned in appellant's brief, and 
so the discussion there made is referred to. At page 
22 of brief appellant refers to the original stock certifi-
cate book (Def's. Ex. 3), calls attention to the new cer-
tificates issued to replace surrendered original ones, 
and then concludes that if the decision of the lower 
court is to stand then the water rights represented 
by the remaining 98 certificates issued is invalid as 
well as the certificates issued after Aug. 20, 1936, and 
that the certificates of every other incorporated irriga-
tion company is also invalid. Respondent is unable to 
understand the basis for this deduction. Certainly, 
appellant would not take the position that the facts 
behind every outstanding certificate are the same as 
the facts in the case at bar. If so, then respondent 
agrees with appellant's conclusion. Hut by referring 
to the said stock ledger, nothing irregular is seen in 
issuing new certificates in lieu of old ones. When 
sales of lands were made the grantors no doubt in con-
nection therewith endorsed and delivered the certificate, 
which was entirely proper. Or as appears from stub 
nos. 96, 97 and 99, the stock certificate was pledged 
to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and Utah Mort-
gage Loan Corporation, no doubt in connection with a 
mortgage of the land to which the water is appurten-
ant, and this also it would seem is proper procedure. 
Certainly no one would conclude that either of these 
corporations would purchase the stock as an investment. 
It is therefore believed that the conclusion reached 
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by appellant is unwarranted, in fact violent. 
Point No. 5: The court was correct, in fact could 
not have done otherwise than to hold plaintiff to be the 
owner of certificate No. 24 and providing for the issu-
ance of another one for the 112 shares of stock by the 
Mendon Central Irrigation Company. 
Counsel for appellant states that such a finding 
constitutes an admission that the water right represent-
ed by certificate No. 24 is not appurtenant to plaintiff's 
property, but is distinct and separate property. Cer-
tainly there is sufficient in the findings to indicate 
otherwise. Respondent is unable to perceive the basis 
for any such deduction and shall therefore not pursue 
this statement any further. Counsel next at page 23 
of brief cites and quotes again from George vs. Robin-
son, supra. This case has been discussed by re-
spondent previously and so shall not duplicate what 
has already been said as to what this case holds and 
stands for. Counsel for respondent believes the only 
answer to be made to appellants' criticism of the quoted 
portion of the lower court's decree given at page 24 
of brief is that the facts under the law justify and sup-
port the court's decree abundantly. It is impossible for 
appellant to see how an allegation in a complaint, fol-
lowed by the court's finding, which described the prop-
erty the subject of the law suit, and found by the court 
to be the property of the plaintiff, can be construed 
to mean that such property belongs to the estate of 
Andrew Andersen, deceased. Appellant has previously 
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discussed the facts and the chain of title referred to h~~ 
appellant at page 25 of brief and so believes there is 
nothing further to be said in regards thereto. Counsel 
next conjectures that the heirs of Andrew Andersen did 
not ask for a probate because possession of the prop-
erty was in his widow and children, although any one 
of them could have sought a probate at any time. What-
ever, excuse might be assigned by counsel of appellant 
for the delay, respondent believes and the lower court 
seen1s to have believed and therefore found otherwise 
and such holding is supported both in the facts and 
certainly in equity. 
Point No. 6: Finding No. 4 is properly included in 
the findings and is supported by equitable consideration. 
At page 26 of brief counsel relates the sustaining 
of an objection, that counsel for respondent conced-
ed that his offer was upon the theory that he believed 
the water right represented by the certificate of stock 
was appurtnant to the land, that the court apparently 
did no agreed with this contention, but that nevertheless 
fourteen months later when the court rendered it de-
cision paragraph four of plaintiff's complaint was in-
cluded in the findings of the court. It is believed 
that there would be no useful purpose accomplished 
by attempting to argue this matter. It involves what 
a court does in "making up its mind" or "in render-
ing its decree". Suffice it to say, however, that the 
same objectionable matter which is complained about 
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appears in Pis. Ex. A, the abstract at pages 31-34, in-
clusive, to the admission of which no objection was 
raised. Furthermore, respondent submits that the De-
cree, following as it does the other conveyances and 
assignments made by the heirs of L. M. Andersen, De-
ceased, who are the same as the heirs of Andrew An-
dersen, Deceased, does have a bearing in equity in this 
case. It is believed that the remainder of the matters 
mentioned and discussed under appellant's Point No. 4 
have heretofore been discussed and treated or do not 
require answer. 
Point No. 7: The court's holding quieting title in 
the plaintiff, etc., is supported in equity, and is entitled 
to be sustained by this court. 
By this point resondent intends to cover the mat-
ters not already treated in this brief and mentioned 
under appellant's Point No. 7: Counsels complains that 
there is no allegation or finding that plaintiff purchas-
ed this stock. Inferentially it appears that the water 
was paid for in connection with the various conveyances 
and assignments made, some of which even specifically 
included appurtenant water rights as hereinbefore stat-
ed. Rarely is a separate price put on water; it goes 
with the land. This is common knowledge. But the 
complete answer to such statement is that the decision 
of the court is supported by the facts proven, the statutes 
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referred to and: the decisions of our court. · No such find-
ings that the stock as such was purchased is therefore 
. . 
necessary. Counsel next says the holding is contrary 
to ~nyder vs. Murdock, 50 Pac. 9, (Utah) (1899) and 
George vs~ .Robison, supra. Both of these cases were 
overruled by the decision in In re Johnson's estate and 
so no useful purpose would be accomplished by discus-
sing the Snyder case. Suffice it to say the facts are 
entirely different from those in the case at bar. Con-
trary to appellant's statement it is submitted that there 
is absoluely no testimony in the record to the effect 
that a majority of the heirs of the estate of Andrew An-
dersen, deceased, permitted certain of the other heirs to 
use the water. Nor is there a single scintilla of evidence 
that the use was premissive. It is believed that the bal-
anc of the statements made in the brief to the affect that 
the lower court's decision amounts to confiscation of 
property forbidden by the constitution, that title can 
only be acquired through a probate sale, that quiet tile 
action can only be maintained by person having title, 
and that he must prevail on the strength of his own 
title and not on the strength of his adversary's, is so 
obviously inapplicable to the facts in this case as to 
require no answer. 
Respondent having fully answered appellant's brief 
it is submitted that the lower court's Decree is sup-
ported both in law and the facts and entitled in equity 
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to be affirmed by this court, together with respondent's 
costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George C. Heinrich 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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